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The following economic issues are discussed:
(i) the market mechanism in general and for the products
"information" and "computers" in particular; (ii) charging
computer jobs and pricing for the allocation of computer re-
sources; (iii) investment analysis for data processing pro-
jects including the estimation of cash flows (objective and
subjective probabilities), risk analysis (Monte Carlo simu-
lation) and sensitivity analysis (based on statistical tech-
niques).
43 References for further study are included.
1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we discuss a number of issues within
a single framework. The framework is provided by the theory
of economics. The issues are (i) the laws which determine
the supply and demand for information and computers within
the company and on the external market place; (ii) the char-
ging and pricing of computer jobs; (iii) investment analysis
íncluding risk (Monte Carlo) analysis and sensitivity studies.
In section 2 we survey some economic concepts needed
in the followíng sections: oligopolistic markets, disecono-
mies of scale, the fixed cost problem, clerical cost dís-
placement versus revenue generation. In section 3 we discuss
the limitations of the market mechanism in general (no per-
fect competition, etc.) and for some products (such as in-
formation) in particular (public goods, externalities).
We explain why benefit evaluation for information systems
cannot be solved by the "internal market" mechanism (supply
and demand within the company). In section 4 we examíne
cost charging and price setting, applying some of the pre-
ceding concepts (externalities, etc.). In section 5 we dis-
cuss investment analysis for data processing projects ,
including the prediction of future cash flows (objective-z-
and subjective probabilities), risk analysis through Monte
Carlo sampling, and sensitivity analysis (including meta-
models and experimental design). 43 References for further
study are included.
2. THE MARKET MECHANISM
In economic theory the market with its price mecha-
nism plays a crucial role. The way supply and demand inter-
act depends on the characteristics of the market, the ex-
tremes being perfect competition and monopoly. In real life
pure monopolies do not exist, since partial substitutes are
always available: coal can replace oil for heating purposes,
margarine is a substitute for butter, etc. The supplier may
try to reduce this substitutability, by creating a technical-
ly unique product, such as a supercomputer for large scale
metereological computations. What really matters, however,
is not the technical qualities of the product, but the
degree to which the consumer (user) differentiates among
products. A well-known method to create an economically
unique product is the creation of brand names: product
differation. As Brock (1975, p. 47) points out, substantial
brand loyalty does exist in computer selection practice.
In general, oligopolistic markets are characterized by the
presence of a few suppliers. The number of competitors may
be limited by product differentiation. For highly techno-
logical products like computers, the entrance of new suppliers
is further limited by the large amounts of capital required
for research and production. The modeling of oligopolistic
markets is quite difficult, and will not be pursued in this
paper. (TCleijnen, 1979 b, does cover a situation wíth an oli-
gopolistic market, using an IBM business game to model this
system . )
Within a company certain supply and demand relation-
ships exist among the various departments. If the company
were organized on a pure profit center basis then the depart-
ments would be completely independent, i.e., they would be-3-
separate economic "households". In that case the classical
economic laws could be applied straightforwardly. Actually
the departments operate under a more or less restrictive
corporate organizational policy. This policy usually provides
the data processing (DP) department with a monopoly since
the user departments are not permitted to buy services outside
the company, a so-called captive market. The regular (compli-
cated) monopoly theory, however, cannot be applied directly,
since the supplier (DP department) and his customers (user
departments) have a common ultimate goal, namely the organi-
zation's prosperity. we shall return to this issue later on.
Observe that whereas classical economics emphasizes
the function of the price mechanism, Keynesian economics
stresses the role played by income. Hence classical economics
explains, say, consumption by its price relative to the
price for competitive usage of income (i.e. savings), whereas
Keynesian economics explains consumption as a function of
available income; see also section 4 on pricing computer
jobs.
The price paid for computers depends on the supply
function for computers (besides the demand function). This
function is influenced by technological progress - such as
the introduction of LSI technology - and economies of scale,
known in the computer field as Grosch's Law.l) Diseconomies
of scale also exists: 2) A large computer system usually
needs data transmission facilities for its utilization, i.e.,
it needs terminals, modems, lines, teleprocessing software,
etc. Moreover one larger system offers less protection
against a break-down of the system than several parallel
smaller systems. Users may further prefer their "own little
pet system". Computer software as opposed to hardware, is
most certainly suspect of diseconomies of scale. The pro-
duction of major software products such as an operatinQ svstem,
requires so many programmers that management of the total
effort becomes a serious problem; Brooks (19741.-4-
For small production volumes, it is economical to
utilize a production technique with relatively low fixed costs,
say machine costs, and relatively high variable costs, say
labor costs. Hence small information systems may not be
computerized, because high fixed costs require massive
production volumes. Note that software utilization has
hardly any variable costs, but does have high fixed develop-
ment costs; a centralized computer system may spread these
software costs over many users. Mini-computers have reduced
the fixed hardware costs, so that decentralization may be-
come economically feasíble. Software costs can also be
spread over many users by using standardized software
packages instead of custom-made software: buy-or-make
decision 3). A dynamic dimension of the fixed costs issue
is the life expectancy of a production unit: the costs of
a computer system can be spread over more users - as seen
over time - by making the system more flexible, so that it
can be used longer. Such flexibility is improved by modular
software, higher level languages, emulation.
Kleijnen (1979b) further discusses some additional
factors: division of labor, production integration, learning
curve, etc.
The buyer of a computer system purchases a production
factor. This production factor can be used to increase re-
venues (gross sales) or to decrease production costs by
productíon-factor substítution. Clerical cost displacement
corresponds with production cost reduction, realized by sub-
stituting capital for labor. Examples of capital-labor sub-
stitution within a computer system are provided by the in-
creased use of high level languages which take less program-
ming time (labor) and more computation and running time,
besides additional memory space (capital). Such substitution
is stimulated by rising labor costs. A different example is
the computerized generation not only of some program, but-5-
of a complete information system; see the ISDOS project 4).
Observe that in practice substitution of capital (computers)
for labor is intrinsically connected with technological pro-
gress, while the production volume is not necessarily kept
constant. In the past post-war period of computerization,
most firms experienced a growing demand for their products.
This is one reason why computerization is not necessarily
accompanied by growing unemployment 5).
The alternative reason for buying production factors
is to increase (gross) revenues. Computers - or better com-
puterized information systems - can improve decision making
so that revenues increase. For instance, real-time airline
reservation systems stimulate the sales of airlíne seats.
Improved decision-making, especially at the operational level,
may also decrease costs. For instance, the same customer ser-
vice (output volume) can be provided with smaller inventories
resulting in lower inventory carrying costs. Such a cost de-
crease is not a simple capital-labor subsitution, but im-
plies technological progress. The optimum degree of computeri-
zation occurs when marginal revenues equal marginal costs 6).
However, the value (revenues) of a computer system - or more
generally an information system - cannot be measured directly
as there is no separate market where its output is sold.
Exceptions are companies, such as time-sharing bureaus, that
offer as their final product computer services ~).
3. LIMITATIONS OF THE MARKET
The classícal economic model assumes perfect compe-
tition with many supply and demand parties and a homogeneous
product, so that the "free forces" of demand and supply
generate an equilibrium price. Supply and demand parties
act purely rationally (homo economicus) with perfect know-
ledge: no uncertainties. The market mechanism acts as an
"invisible hand" that ensures optimum welfare for the
economy as a whole. For example, in the long run the market-6-
mechanism will eliminate inefficient suppliers. In practice
many of the assumptions of the classical model do not hold:
Suppliers differentiate their products (brand names), the li-
mited number of suppliers may collude, inefficient production
units may be supported by other divisions of a company,
new suppliers cannot enter the market because of high re-
search and development expenses, consumers buy only locally,
payoffs are uncertain, decision-makers do not maximize
but satisfice, etc. These factors cause the market not to
function optimally.
For some products there are additional causes that
make the market inadequate. The product may not be marketable
in separate units: public goods. Examples are national defense,
natural scenery, highways. These products cannot be sold in
units to individual consume.rs. The consumption by one in-
dividual does not necessarily mean that other consumers
have less. Products may further have external effects or
spillovers,i.e. they have unintended effects on other
producers or consumers. These effects can be negative, for
instance, ecological pollution by a steel plant, health
risk created by nuclear plants, waiting caused by other
customers in a queuing system. Negative external effects are
usually not reflected in the producer's costs. (This situation
is changing: oil refineries are being charged for their
damage to the natural sky-line ,)The external effects can
be positive too. For instance, investments may be stimulated
by the possibility of buying certain products, say railway
transportation service: economic infrastructure. Production
of articles with positive spillovers may be stimulated by
subsidies (negative taxes) 8). A product may further have
value both as a consumption good and as an investment:
educational systems, library services. In modern economics,
goods for which the market mechanism is inadequate, are
evaluated using cost~benefit analysis. Some of its techniques,such as Net Present Value, are borrowed from other areas
and will be discussed below. As a whole, however, the cost~
benefit approach does not seem to contribute much to the
analysis of the benefits of computerized information systems.
Therefore we shall not discuss this approach in more detail,
but refer to the literature 9).
Obviously the product infor-
matíon suffers from many of the complications mentioned above:
There is no unit of information. (The unit "bit" developed
in the Shannon-Weaver "information" theory - a more accurate
term would be"communication"theory - is írrelevant since
we are interested in the meaning of information. Hence
two messages of the same length, may have quite different
importance: "your match burns" versus "your house burns" or
"dog bites man" versus "man bites dog".)Hence the producer
cannot supply the consumer with a specific amount of infor-
mation. He does not even know how much information is con-
tained in, say, the report he supplies since it depends on
the receiver's prior knowledge. The reading of the report
by other consumers does not reduce the information content
for the original consumer (publíc good). It may, however,
affect the economic benefits of that information: inside
information has different effects in, say the stock market,
when it becomes publíc information. So the competitive ad-
vantage is affected by the number of people using the in-
formation. Negative external effects of information pro-
duction may be security and privacy risks. Positive ex-
ternal effects of information systems are clear since such
systems form part of the necessary infrastructure. Infor-
mation does not only serve decision-making, but may also be
appreciated as such, i.e., be "consumed" 10).
The product computers does not show the problems
just discussed for the product "information". It is a
product well comparable to many other products, i.e., capital
goods. As with such goods the market mechanisme does not
work exactly as the classical economic theory assumes.-8-
Actually, no industry shows such domination by a single
suppliers, IBM. The índustry is further characterized by
product differentiation. New suppliers cannot enter the
market because of tremendous research expenses involved,
and old suppliers are eliminated because of this factor.
Consumers cannot alcaays shop around since they are "locked
ín" with a specific computer manufacturer because of con-
version problems. So the market mechanism does certainly
not function optimally. Note that besides the market for
computers, there are also markets for the product "infor-
mation". That information product can be, say,library
services. We may also include software houses, consulting
companies, and the like
11).
Next we look at the market within the firm where
suppliers and users of information meet. Some authors feel
that they can solve the problem of benefit evaluation for
information systems, by referring to the market mechanism
lz).
They emphasize that the data processing department sells a
product to the other departments (users) on the "market
place" wíthin the company. This approach has serious limita-
tions:
(i) The product is ill defined: lack of a unit of ineasurement,
non-destructive usage, competitive benefits, negative ex-
ternal effects on security and privacy, positive external
effects through the economic infrastructure, and consumptive
versus productive usage. More specifically, the DP depart-
ment offers an ambiguous product, namely DP-services and
data. The services may be interactíve computing facilíties
to which the user can subscribe. The data may be weekly
reports, or a data base that can be queried interactively.
Nevertheless, in principle we can stíll determine the pro-
duction costs for each individual type of service and pro-
duct; the cost accounting problems involved will be dis-
cussed in the next section. Another issue is that the user-9-
is often a supplier of the raw materials (data) on which
the DP-department works. For instance, the inventory
manager supplies weekly sales data whereupon the DP-depart-
ment computes forecasts and order proposals. Such a con-
sumer~producer relationship is rather uníque in modern
industry. (It is not unusual in handicraft: house-painters,
tailors.) It means that the supplier does not offer a
product, but offers a(transformation) service. This also
affects his market situation. For instance, production can
be done only on order; staple production is impossible.
(ii) The market mechanism works correctly only if the
com any is organized according to the profit center principle:
The market mechanism is supposed to bring together producers
and consumers. In a free-competition model there are a
great many suppliers who are not colluding. In our case,
however, there is a single DP-department so that a monopoly
situation exists. The monopoly model does not pretend to
lead to maximum welfare for the economy as a whole, i.e.,
the total company 13). The company may decide to permit the
users to go outside the company for their data processing
needs. In that case a user may buy, say, number-crunching
services from a time-sharing bureau. Usually, however, the
company prefers to have most of its DP in-house. This
preference is based on security and privacy protection,
increased flexibility (control over rush jobs, informal
procedures), and so on. The preference for in-house
DP ís not surprising since DP - computerized or not - is
an essential part of the production process: Any production
process needs management as a basic production factor (be-
sides labor, capital,and land), based on information which
ín turn requires data processing. Besides the monopolistic
position of the DP-department, the market mechanism is
drastically affected by the common goal of the DP supplier-10-
and his customers. In a classic model the two market parties
have conflicting objectives. In the present situation, how-
ever, both parties are members of the same organization
that has an ultimate goal (or multiple goals) to which
the parties agreed to cooperate. Only if the departments
were pure profit centers, they would strive towards
their own goals without regard for the overall goal. Such
a construction, however, could mean the disintegration of
the organization. It can be shown that, if the DP-depart-
ment maximizes its own profit, then a suboptimum for the
organization as a whole results
14).
Note that modern systems with distributed computíng
and networks of computers, complicate the above pícture.
The DP department becomes decentralized into geographical
subdivisions. (Logically local mini's are part of the DP
department, though organizationally they may be managed
by the local user department.) The user may then choose
between local and remote computing services. Nevertheless,
if the DP department serves a single firm, its components are
tiupposed to have a common,ultimate goa1,15)
How should the DP-price be determined, more practi-
cally speaking? Under a pure profit-center approach, the
users could be charged at the external market price.
However, if we wish to see the market as a mechanism for
determining the benefits of information, then the price
should depend on the supply function of the producer (DP-
department and possibly, external suppliers) and the de-
mand functions of the buyers (user departments). Hence,
one factor is the costs of the DP-department, which in-
clude part of the company's overhead costs such as top
management salaries and heating, allocated in a rather arbi-
trary way; see the next section. The other factor should
be the benefits (value) to the user-departments. But how
can these benefits be computed? The original problem
has returned again: So the pricing of computer services-11-
within a company is not the answer to the problem of evalu-
ating benefits to the company 16). In practice, pricing
computer services do occur. However, such a practice is
a cost accounting issue to be discussed next.
4. CHARGING AND PRICING COMPUTER JOBS
In general, cost accounting is needed to compute
the profit, i.e., to determine how well the company
as a whole is doing "recently", say, over the past year or
quarter. Therefore we have to use costs instead of ex-
penses, and distribute fixed costs among product units
over time (depreciation). Nominal profits have to be avoided
using replacement (current) cost rather than historical
costs. The resulting overall picture should be differentiated
- allocating overhead costs - by product line and department,
so that products yielding losses can be díscontínued and
inefficient departments can be concentrated on: management
by exception. Therefore we further need concepts like
joint costs (two products simultaneously produced) and cost
versus loss. Standard cost per unit, multiplied by standard
or expected capacity utilization results in a budget for
the department or product line (or more precísely for
the "cost center"; such a cost center may be "data entry").
Comparing budget estimates to actual costs is the area
of variance analysis.l~)
Costs are also needed as a basis for pricing.
Theoretically, profit maximalization requires that prices
be set such that marginal costs equal marginal revenues.
In practice a mark-up approach is often followed, i.e.,
the price is set equal to, say, 110~ of the average cost.
Such a policy is certainly reasonable for non-profit orga-
nizations such as hospitals.
Let us next concentrate on cost accounting, speci-
fically in the computer area. Calculating the "exact"-12-
cost becomes difficult in the presence of fixed and joint
costs.18) Unfortunately, most computer costs are fixed
indeed: CPU rent, software development costs, etc. Few
costs are variable: input~output costs such as punched
cards and paper, and the like. Joint costs are abundant
too: The operating system and the data base system support
many applications. In general, modern computer systems
are characterized by "shared" resources. Recently guide-
lines for computer cost accounting were developed by a
group of practitioners; Statland (1977).
Notwithstanding the problems of calculating the
"exact" cost, computer charging is recommended, so that
the efficiency of user departments, projects, product
lines, and the DP department itself can be measured and
hence be controlled. Moreover, if computer capacíty is
limited - especially during peak periods - this capacity
must be allocated somehow (see also below). One solution
is to have users buy computer resources from their budget,
possibly charging a higher price at peak hours. Alternatives
are: assign each user a fixed numer of CPU time units,
utilize a first-come-first-served rule, and so on. A
general discussion - not limited to computers - on the
price mechanism for the allocation of scarce resources,
including price discrimination and quantity discounts,
price versus cost, and so on, can be found in Sharpe (1969).
Note that "hard" budgets can be spent on either computer or
other goods; "soft" budgets imply "funny" money spendable
on computer services only.19)
We assume that the reader is familiar with algorithms
for charging computer costs, involving issues such as repro-
ducibilíty, demurrage (spillovers), equitability, etc. 20)
Cost accounting and pricing are relat~d, but de-
finitely not identical. If the DP department were a pure
profit center, it might maximize its own profit, guided
by the law of equalizing marginal costs and revenues. If-13-
t}ie department uses a mark-up policy, its goal may be cost
recovery plus a"modest" profit. For the organization as
a whole, pricing can serve as an allocation mechanism for
scarce resources. Hence in peak hours higher prices may
be charged; in the early phase of a new computer system
low prices may stimulate usage. The reactions of the users
to these prices, depend on their demand curves (value
functions)and on the prices for alternative production
techniques, i.e. manual methods or outside DP services:
direct and indirect elasticities. As in a national economy,
top management may amend the price mechanism by imposing
maximum price limits, subsidizing certain users, etc.
The reason for such intervention is, that the price mecha-
nism does not work as perfectly as classical economic
theory assumes. For instance, a user may have very valuable
applications in mind, but may not have the income (budget)
to pay the price. External effects (spillovers) may
be compensated by taxes and subsidies (negative taxes).
For instance, pioneeríng applications may be subsidized
whereas peak-load usage which creates congestions can
be charged extra.21) Other imperfections of the price
mechanisme in general, and for information in particular,
were discussed ín the preceding section.
In summary, in data processing cost accounting is
needed by the DP department, the user departments, and
top management. The DP department and the user departments
need such information for their individual cost~effectiveness
evaluation. Top management needs this information in order
to weigh DP investments against competing activities.22)
5. INVESTMENT, RISK AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Buying a computer or inítiating a DP project, is
an investment, i.e., money is paid now whereas revenues
will materialize only later. Hence the classical problems
of investment analysis or capital budgetíng arise, namely-14-
the time value and the risk of future streams of expenses
and revenues. Different time patterns of cash flows -
affected by the system life cycle - may be evaluated through
such familiar techniques as payback period, internal rate of
23)
return, or net present value (NPV) .
In the computer literature some authors 24) favor
the relative NPV: Let PC denote positive cash flows or
revenues, and NC negative cash flows or expenses. Then the
relative NPV is defined as:
RNPV- { E PCt~(lfp)t} ~{ E NCt~(lfp)t}
t-0 t-0
Their idea is that if two projects have the same NPV, but
project 1 requires a payment of, say 10 K dollars, whereas
project 2 takes only 1 K dollars, then the less expensive
project 2 is more attractive. However, we should like to
argue as follows. If the company can make 10 K dollars
available for investments, then project 1 generates a
positive NPV, whereas project 2 leaves 9 K dollars without
a positive NPV. If we want to incorporate the availability
of financial funds explicitly, we can turn to linear pro-
gramming, or mathematical programming in general. Such an
approach may also be called for, if we wish to take into
account a variety of investment opportunities over time
25).
what is the practical use of the above investment
analysis techniques? Brigham (1976) discusses the appli-
cation of these techniques outside the computer area. Dean
(1968, p.90) shows how many companies actually formalize
the view that computer projects are investments. Hall 8~
Lincoln (1976) applied the rate of return criterion in
an extensive DP case study. Discounted cash flows are used
by the English government; see Head (1975).-15-
Note that the above techniques also play a role in
the purchase versus lease choice and the buy or make option.
Once the decision is made to go ahead with a computer
project, its scheduling may be done using a PERT network
or some other technique to evaluate project progress 26).
In the formulas for NPV, we need to quantify the
predicted, future cash flows. These cash flows comprise
DP expenses, savings in operating costs, and revenue in-
creases. The quantification of revenues is a difficult sub-
ject, discussed in Kleijnen (1979b). Estimating the decrease
in operating costs requires the same kind of approach.
Remains the estimation of the future DP expenses incurred
by a particular project. Such estimation is greatly facili-
tated by the recording of past costs and expenses for
similar DP projects, i.e., by doing cost accounting as
discussed in the preceding section. Regression analysis
can then be applied to predict expenses for a future pro-
ject if that project is "similar" to past projects for
which data have been accumulated. For instance, in past
projects direct labor (the dependent variable) may be main-
ly determined by such variables as the number of I~0
devices and the number of jobs (independent, explanatory
variables). Case studies using regression analysis for
the prediction of programming costs, can be found in the
references 27). Regression analysis based on past, objective
data yields objective probabilities.
If no previous similar projects are available, we
may resort to expert opinions which result in subjective or
personal probabilities. That is, we ask an "expert" (manager,
user, staff inember) how likely it is that specifíc outcomes
are realized: Y'or instance, the expert may state that
the most likely life time of the project is-16-
5 years, and that the probability of lífe tímes greater than
7 years or smaller than 2 years is 108 each. Solliciting such
subjective probabilities has become quite common, especially
in Bayesian statistics and DELPHI techniques. The quantifi-
cation of subjective probabilities is discussed in many
publications 28).
Since the NPV depends on probabilistic variables
we want to estimate the distribution of the resulting NPV.
The complete distribution may be characterized by a few
measures like the median and the 10~ quantile.29) This dis-
tribution may also be used to estimate the probability of
"extremes", for instance, a negative NPV. The distribution
of NPV can be obtained through simulation (Monte Carlo
sampling) also known as risk analysis. Other (less desirable)
techniques have also been proposed,e.g. charging a higher
discount rate when the cash flow is more uncertain,30)
Risk analysis should be distinguished from sensi-
tivity analysis. In the latter case we may investigate the
effects of changes in specific assumptions of our model.
For instance, a normal distribution or a growth curve may
be replaced by some other specification (qualitative change),
or the cost of capital p may be changed from 10~ to 15g
(quantitative change). Sensitivity analysis is also a first
step in optimization and satisficing. The satisficing ap-
proach is less ambitious but more practical than optimiza-
tion, and is associated with the "what if" approach. If
we want to optimize or satisfice, we may first determine
which decision variables (price, sales promotion, RB~D) have
important effects on our criterion (NPV). Factors to which
the criterion is not very sensitive, can be ignored in the
search for an optimal or satisficing solution. Note that
in sensitivity analysis we change the input variables and
model assumptions systematically (not randomly as in
risk analysis) and have the values of variables and para-
meters vary over the whole range they can assume. Fisher-17-
(1971) gives several approaches and examples of sensitivity
analysis. tlis examples demonstrate that if many "factors"
(variables, parameters, assumptions) are studied, it becomes
difficult to determine which factor combinations to in-
vestigate and how to interpret and cteneralize the great
mass (or mess?) of output data. Elsewhere we discussed
the use of a"metamodel" or auxiliary mode1.31) Such a
metamodel formalizes and extends the following common
sense procedure: A practioner might change one variable x,
observe the resulting output y, repeat this procedure ,
plot the (x, y) combinations, fit a curve by hand, and
decide whether x affects y. We formalized this hand fitting
by the use of the least squares algorithm, extended the pro-
cedure to multiple inputs, and systematized the steps.
We further emphasized the role of interactions among input
factors.32) Note that the selection of factor combinations
to be investigated, is part of traditional statistical
theory, and is known as experimental design
33)
6. Conclusions.
We surveyed a number of topics mainly taken from
microeconomic theory. We explained and criticized the
market mechanism. We further indicated how the general
economic theory applies to the products "information" and
"computers". Special attention was paid to the inadequacy
of the market mechanism for solving the benefit evaluation
problem for information products within a company.
This lead us to the charging and pricing of computer jobs.
Such a practice is useful for efficiency control and re-
source allocation. Next we discussed the investment charac-
ter of data processing projects, using Net Present Value,
risk analysis (Monte Carlo sampling), and sensitivity
studies (using a metamodel).-18-
NOTES
1. C-K ~É with costs C, effectiveness E, and constant K.
2. Cotton (1975),Shàrpe (1969), Selwyn (1971), Phister (1976).
3. Hoyt (1975).
4. Ccuger 8 Knapp (1974).
5. Kleijnen (1975 b).
6. Emery (1971).
7. Cotton (1975).
8. Lin (1976), Mishan (1971).
9. Cooper (1973), Keeney 8 Raíffa (1976).
10. See also Flowerdew 8~ Whitehead (1975).
11. Brock (1975), Cotton (1975), Sharpe (1969), Phister (1976).
12. Cunninghame-Green(1973), Willoughby (1975}.
13. Brock (1975) .
14. Sharpe (1969).
15. Bernard et al.(1977).
16. See also Welke (1977).
17. Bernard et al. (1977), Itami (1973).
18. Fisher (1971), Cotton (1975), Emery (1971), Sharpe (1969).
19. Bernard et al. (1977), Smidt (1968).
20. Bernard et al. (1977), Kleíjnen(1979 b).
21. Bernard et al. (1977).
22. Additional references: GAO (1976), Hamilton (1977),
Hootman (1977), Palmer (1975).
23. Fisher (1971), Sharpe (1969).
24. Menkhaus (1969), Schwartz (1969); also Fisher (1971).
25. Bussey (1978) , Levy 8~ Sarnat (1978) .
26. Grindley 8 Humble (1973), Brooks (1974), GAO (1976).
27. Chrysler (1978), GAO (1967), see also Fisher (1971) for
a non-computer oriented exposé.
28. Huber (1974), Spetzler b Holstein (1975).
29. The 10~ quantile, say q10 , is defined by P(x~q10 )-0.10.
30. Fisher (1971), Gitman 8 Forrester (1977), Sharpe (1969).
31. Kleijnen(1979 a) .
32. For interactions see also Ein-Dor b Seger (1978).
33. Kleijnen(1975 a).-19-
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